California Western Law Review
Volume 50

Number 1

Article 2

2013

Watch What You Say (and Do): The Use of Settlement
Negotiations and Mediation Conduct to Prove Bad Faith Under
California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Robert G. Knaier

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr

Recommended Citation
Knaier, Robert G. (2013) "Watch What You Say (and Do): The Use of Settlement Negotiations and
Mediation Conduct to Prove Bad Faith Under California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act," California Western
Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

Knaier: Watch What You Say (and Do): The Use of Settlement Negotiations a
Knaier Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/24/2014 10:16 AM

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50

FALL 2013

NUMBER 1

WATCH WHAT YOU SAY (AND DO):
THE USE OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION
CONDUCT TO PROVE BAD FAITH UNDER CALIFORNIA’S
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
ROBERT G. KNAIER *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................. 2
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 3
I.
CUTSA PROVIDES FOR FEE-SHIFTING SANCTIONS TO
PUNISH AND DETER BAD-FAITH TRADE SECRET LITIGATION....... 5
A. Fee Shifting Is an Exceptional Sanction in American
Jurisprudence ........................................................................ 6
B. Under CUTSA, Courts Have Broad Power to
Award Attorneys’ Fees ................................................................ 6
1. An Award of Attorneys’ Fees, as a Sanction, Is
*
Partner with the law firm Chapin Fitzgerald LLP, in San Diego, California;
B.A., University of California, San Diego, 1999; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2003;
clerkship with Judge Richard C. Wesley at the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, 2003-2004. Mr. Knaier has spent the past decade representing
defendants and plaintiffs through all stages of litigation, including alternative
dispute resolution, trial, and appeal. He thanks friends and colleagues Kenneth
Fitzgerald, Dennis Klein, and Professor Thomas Barton for their helpful feedback
and commentary on this article. He also thanks Michelle Knaier, his wife of 20
years, for her continued support and encouragement.

1

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 2
Knaier Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete)

2

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

3/24/2014 10:16 AM

[Vol. 50

Warranted When a Party Brings or Maintains
Objectively Specious Claims in Subjective Bad
Faith................................................................................. 7
2. Anti-Competitive Behavior Can Be Evidence of
Objective Speciousness .................................................... 8
3. Mere Speculation of Misappropriation Will Not
Support an Argument that Claims Were Pursued in
Good Faith ....................................................................... 9
4. Evidence of Subjective Bad Faith Comes in Many
Forms ............................................................................. 10
II.
THE ROBUST, BUT NARROW, CONFIDENTIALITY OF
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS MAY YIELD TO THE POLICY OF
DETERRING BAD-FAITH TRADE SECRET LITIGATION ................. 12
A. Settlement Negotiations Enjoy Robust, but Narrow,
Confidentiality..................................................................... 13
B. Settlement Negotiations Can Constitute Evidence of
Bad Faith ............................................................................ 15
III. THE BROAD CONFIDENTIALITY AFFORDED TO MEDIATION
LIKELY PRECLUDES COMMUNICATIONS—BUT MAY PERMIT
CONDUCT—AS EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH ................................... 18
A. Mediation Communications Are Given “Maximum
Protection,” and Thus Are Likely Inadmissible as
Evidence of Bad Faith ......................................................... 19
1. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even
in the Face of Important Countervailing Public
Policy ............................................................................. 19
2. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even
When They Otherwise Would Support Sanctions .......... 21
B. Mediation Conduct, However, May in Principle
Provide a Basis for a Finding of Bad Faith........................ 22
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 26
ABSTRACT
This article explores the intersection of two policy considerations
that shape, in part, California’s law of trade secrets: (1) the power of
courts to impose attorney-fee sanctions on parties that bring or
maintain trade secret claims in bad faith; and (2) the confidentiality of
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settlement negotiations and mediation. Both policies serve the
purpose of efficiency in litigation. To deter trade secret plaintiffs from
litigating baseless claims, courts have broad power to sanction such
conduct. And to encourage early and informal dispute resolution, the
law provides for robust confidentiality of settlement negotiations and
mediation. These consonant policies, however, can come into conflict.
When what is said and done during settlement negotiations or
mediation indicate that a party is acting in bad faith, a question arises
whether that party’s words or conduct may be used as evidence in
support of a request for sanctions.
Is discouraging bad-faith litigation so important that a defendant
may introduce evidence of what otherwise might be considered
confidential?
This article concludes that (1) although the
confidentiality of settlement negotiations is strong, it is narrow—it
will readily yield to the policy of deterring bad-faith litigation; and (2)
although the confidentiality of mediation is substantially broader—its
protection of communications is nearly absolute—it may not shield
certain forms of conduct from being used as evidence of bad faith. In
conclusion, this article offers practical advice to trade secret litigants,
given the danger that what they say (and do) during settlement
negotiations and mediation may return to haunt them.
INTRODUCTION
Legal rules often reflect a balancing of social policy
considerations. In California, the law governing trade secrets is
strongly shaped by such balancing. 1 Indeed, California’s Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) formally codifies the importance of
intellectual property to our modern economy. 2 A firm’s trade secrets
can be central to its ability to develop and maintain a competitive
advantage in the marketplace. The law thus protects this information,
setting forth, in detail, what constitutes a trade secret, and what one
party must prove to establish that another party misappropriated its
1. Trade secrets consist of information that “[d]erives independent economic
value . . . from not being generally known to the public,” and that is the “subject of
[reasonable] efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West
1997).
2. Id. §§ 3426.1-3426.11.
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trade secrets. Moreover, the law recognizes that trade secret
litigation, itself, can stifle competition. Legislatures and courts have
taken steps to discourage such anti-competitive conduct, penalizing
those who bring or maintain trade secret litigation in bad faith.
Specifically, in California, a party that brings or maintains a trade
secret claim in bad faith may suffer the potentially crushing sanction
of having to pay its adversary’s attorneys’ fees. 3
But the policy of discouraging bad-faith trade secret litigation
conflicts, at times, with other important policy considerations. For
example, few principles are as central to the efficient operation of the
legal system as the confidentiality of attempts to settle or mediate
disputes short of costly and protracted litigation. Thus, in California,
settlement negotiations and mediation generally enjoy robust
confidentiality. 4 If it were otherwise, parties might hesitate to be
frank and forthcoming in their attempts to resolve disputes out of
court, and they might hesitate to mediate their differences. Parties
may fear that what they say or do could be used against them in later
proceedings. Removing that fear encourages candid, early, and
informal dispute resolution—and reduces the time and cost that
litigation might otherwise impose on the parties and the courts.
What happens, however, when CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule collides
with confidentiality? What happens, for example, when a party’s
settlement communications or mediation conduct clearly demonstrates
that it pursued a trade secret claim in bad faith? Is encouraging early
dispute resolution so strong a principle that even such damning
evidence must remain confidential? Or is the need to discourage badfaith trade secret litigation—and thus safeguard appropriate economic
activity—so powerful that it can allow the disclosure of otherwise
protected communications?
This article addresses those questions by exploring the impact of
conflicting policies of discouraging bad-faith trade secret litigation
and encouraging settlement of trade secret claims (meritorious and
meritless). In Part I, it explains the substantial power of California
courts to grant a request for attorneys’ fees under CUTSA. In Part II,
3. Id. § 3426.4; see also FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 312
(Ct. App. 2009) (finding that trade secret misappropriation claims were brought in
bad faith, and awarding $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees).
4. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1119, 1152, 1154 (West 2009) (protecting
mediation communications, settlement offers, and settlement demands).
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it discusses the purpose and breadth of California’s protections for
settlement negotiations, and how those protections can yield to the
policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation—permitting the
admission of settlement negotiations to prove bad faith. In Part III,
this article describes the strong confidentiality afforded to mediation
communications and how it likely withstands CUTSA’s fee-shifting
provisions—but also suggests that mediation conduct may
nevertheless constitute admissible evidence of bad faith.
In
conclusion, this article provides practical advice to those involved in
trade secret disputes, given that a subsequent request for attorneys’
fees under CUTSA may place settlement and mediation
communications and conduct at risk of disclosure.
I. CUTSA PROVIDES FOR FEE-SHIFTING SANCTIONS TO PUNISH AND
DETER BAD-FAITH TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
In the area of trade secret litigation, legislatures and courts pay
special attention to claims brought with no objective basis and,
moreover, in subjective bad faith. Such claims can be used by
unscrupulous litigants to strike at the heart of competition in a world
increasingly driven by intellectual property. Simply being forced to
defend a trade secret claim can drain a firm’s resources and distract it
from pursuing its main economic goals. And of course, suffering an
adverse judgment on such a claim—whether that judgment imposes
injunctive relief, damages, or both—can compound these effects
enormously.
To protect against this harm, the law permits the target of a
baseless, bad-faith trade secret claim to seek recovery of attorneys’
fees it incurred in defending that claim. CUTSA, for example,
provides that where “a claim of [trade secret] misappropriation is
made in bad faith . . . the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs to the prevailing party.” 5 This is a sharp break from the
normal rule that parties to a litigation generally bear their own
attorneys’ fees—but California courts have explained that it is
justified by the importance of discouraging improper interference with
healthy competition.

5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West 1997).
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A. Fee Shifting Is an Exceptional Sanction in American
Jurisprudence
Having to pay an adversary’s attorneys’ fees is, in the context of
American jurisprudence, a significant sanction. A core aspect of
litigation in the United States—one so important it is simply known as
the “American Rule”—is that “each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily
pay his own attorney fees.” 6 This principle has been part of
California’s legal landscape since the 19th century, with its 1872
inclusion in the Code of Civil Procedure. 7
Nonetheless, this hallmark of American litigation has exceptions.
For example, private parties may agree that a “prevailing party” in a
contractual dispute be awarded attorneys’ fees it “incurred to enforce
[the] contract.” 8 Similarly, under the private attorney general
doctrine, a “court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party
against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted
in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest.” 9 In addition, and directly relevant here, a court may order
that one party pay another party’s attorneys’ fees as a sanction to
punish and deter frivolous, vexatious, or bad-faith conduct during
litigation. 10
B. Under CUTSA, Courts Have Broad Power to
Award Attorneys’ Fees
The statutory power to award attorneys’ fees as a sanction for
bad-faith trade secret litigation has been extensively litigated. Courts
have thus defined the sort of “bad faith” that will warrant sanctions
6. Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259, 262 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
7. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2007) (“Except as
attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or
implied, of the parties . . . .”).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 1997).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2007).
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5
(West 2007) (“Every trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both to
pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as
a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.”).
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under CUTSA, made it clear that their power in this regard is broad,
and discussed the kinds of evidence that will support a finding of bad
faith.
1. An Award of Attorneys’ Fees, as a Sanction, Is Warranted
When a Party Brings or Maintains Objectively Specious
Claims in Subjective Bad Faith
Just over ten years ago, in Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California
Custom Shapes, Inc., a California Court of Appeal set the basic
parameters of an award of attorneys’ fees under CUTSA. 11 In that
case, Taskmaster Industries Corporation (“Taskmaster”) hired Gemini
Aluminum Corporation (“Gemini”) to provide aluminum parts for the
“Taskmaster workbench.” 12 The workbenches were manufactured by
Taskmaster and marketed to the public by Makita. 13 Gemini
subcontracted with California Custom Shapes, Inc. (“CCS”) to
“powder coat” the aluminum parts. 14
After Taskmaster began experiencing financial problems, Gemini
stopped supplying it with parts and CSS began providing parts directly
to Taskmaster. 15 Gemini sued CSS, alleging, among other things, that
CCS misappropriated its trade secrets. 16 Gemini lost, and, under
CUTSA, the trial court found that Gemini brought its
misappropriation claim in bad faith—and awarded CCS over
$160,000 in attorneys’ fees. 17
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It first noted that neither CUTSA
nor the California state courts had yet defined “bad faith” for the
purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees. 18 The court nevertheless held
that a finding of “bad faith” under CUTSA “requires objective
speciousness of the plaintiff’s claim . . . and its subjective bad faith in

11. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 358 (Ct. App. 2002).
12. Id. at 361.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 362.
16. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
17. Id. at 363.
18. Id. at 367.
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bringing or maintaining the claim.” 19 In doing so, the court noted that
CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule is meant to be a “deterrent” to such
specious claims. 20 The court further stressed that because an “award
of attorney fees for bad faith constitutes a sanction, and the trial court
has broad discretion in ruling on sanctions motions,” trial courts have
broad discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees under CUTSA. 21
Applying these standards, the court upheld the sanction of
attorneys’ fees assessed against Gemini. 22 The court noted the
complete “lack of any proof” that the trade secrets at issue had
“economic value,” given that Taskmaster, the recipient of parts to
which the trade secrets related, was essentially insolvent at the
relevant time. 23 Further, reflecting one of the core purposes of
CUTSA—discouraging bad-faith, anti-competitive conduct—the court
also noted that Gemini’s principal had repeatedly testified that CCS’s
principal was a “snake.” 24 The court thus found that a deterrent fee
award was in order, because the evidence strongly indicated that
Gemini brought suit, at least in part, to send a message to a competitor
it did not like.
2. Anti-Competitive Behavior Can Be Evidence of Objective
Speciousness
More recently, in FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, a California
Court of Appeal indicated that an anti-competitive motive is at least
one basis for finding that a party’s claims are objectively specious. 25
In that case, two shareholders and officers of FLIR Systems, Inc.
(“FLIR”)—a manufacturer of infrared cameras, night-vision devices,
and other “thermal imaging systems that use microbolometers”—left
FLIR to start a new company to mass-produce microbolometers. 26
The former officers began negotiating with Raytheon Company to
19. Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added) (citing and discussing Stilwell Dev., Inc. v.
Chen, No. CV86-4487-GHK, 1989 WL 418783 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989)).
20. Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 370.
23. Id. at 369.
24. Id.
25. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 314-15 (Ct. App. 2009).
26. Id. at 312.
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“acquire licensing, technology, and manufacturing facilities” for their
new venture, and announced a timeline during which that company
would begin mass-producing microbolometers. 27 FLIR sued the
officers to enjoin any misappropriation or threatened misappropriation
of its trade secrets. 28 At trial, the court found no such actual or
threatened misappropriation—and further found that FLIR brought its
case in bad faith, ordering it to pay over $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees
and costs. 29
As in Gemini, the Court of Appeal affirmed. In addition to
finding that FLIR lacked any actual “evidence of misappropriation” or
“harm,” 30 the court concluded that “[o]bjective speciousness was
established by evidence that [FLIR] had an anticompetitive motive in
filing the lawsuit” and thus “filed a specious action as a preemptive
strike” against its former officers. 31 Indeed, FLIR’s CEO had testified
that the company simply could not “tolerate a direct competitive
threat” from its former officers. 32 The court further found that FLIR’s
subjective bad faith was evidenced, in part, by its unwarranted
reliance on merely fearing a misuse of trade secrets. 33
3. Mere Speculation of Misappropriation Will Not Support an
Argument that Claims Were Pursued in Good Faith
In SASCO v. Rosendin Electric, Inc., a California Court of Appeal
recently reaffirmed its broad powers to award attorneys’ fees as a
sanction for bad-faith trade secret litigation—stressing that mere
speculation that an adversary misappropriated trade secrets will not
support a conclusion that a claim was brought in good faith. 34 There,
several management-level employees of SASCO, an electrical
contractor, left the company and joined Rosendin Electric, Inc.
(“Rosendin”), another electrical contractor. 35 SASCO sued its former
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Flir, 95 Cal. Rprtr. 3d at 315.
Id. at 314.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 317.
SASCO v. Rosendin Elec., Inc., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 830.
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employees and Rosendin, claiming, among other things,
misappropriation of trade secrets. 36 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, and after the parties engaged in “fierce discovery
battles,” SASCO voluntarily dismissed its claims without opposing
the motion. 37 The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’
request for sanctions under CUTSA, ordering SASCO to pay
approximately $485,000 in attorneys’ fees. 38
In affirming the fee award, the Court of Appeal followed Gemini
and FLIR, explaining that: (1) “bad faith” under CUTSA includes both
objective speciousness and subjective bad faith; (2) fee awards under
CUTSA are a “sanction” meant to be a “deterrent to specious trade
secret claims”; and (3) courts have “broad discretion” in imposing
such sanctions. 39 Finding no “evidence in the record supporting the
claim that defendant[s] misappropriated SASCO’s trade secrets,” the
court explained that it “was perfectly legitimate for Rosendin to hire
the individual defendants and for the individual defendants to leave
Mere
the employ of SASCO in favor of a competitor.” 40
“[s]peculation that the individual employees must have taken trade
secrets . . . [did] not constitute evidence of misappropriation.” 41
4. Evidence of Subjective Bad Faith Comes in Many Forms
It is thus clear that trial courts have broad discretion under
CUTSA to sanction parties for bringing and maintaining objectively
specious misappropriation claims—and doing so with subjective bad
faith. But this raises difficult questions of proof. Although objective
speciousness of a claim seems relatively straightforward as an
evidentiary matter—does a party have evidence to support its
misappropriation claims?—subjective bad faith is less concrete, and
thus potentially more difficult to prove. How does the target of
36. Id. at 831.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 832-33.
39. SASCO, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
40. Id. at 837.
41. Id.; see also FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 317 (Ct. App.
2009) (finding that FLIR’s subjective bad faith was evidenced, in part, by its
unwarranted reliance on merely fearing a misuse of trade secrets).
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objectively specious claims demonstrate subjective bad faith?
Necessarily, such proof is likely to be a matter of reasonable
inference. As the Gemini court explained, a “subjective state of mind
will rarely be susceptible of direct proof; usually the trial court will be
required to infer it from circumstantial evidence.” 42
Circumstantial evidence of subjective bad faith can take many
forms. A court might, for example, infer from a “complete failure of
proof” that a party “must have knowingly and intentionally prosecuted
a specious claim.” 43 In this way, objective speciousness may be so
clear that it, alone, can support a finding of “bad faith” under CUTSA.
Proving subjective bad faith thus can be similar to the manner of
proving subjective malice in a malicious prosecution case, where such
malice may be inferred, at least in part, from a lack of probable cause,
an objective determination based on the lack of evidence supporting
the unsuccessful underlying claim. 44
Sometimes, however, there is evidence from which a subjective
state of mind can be more strongly inferred, such as when “the
specific shortcomings of the case are identified by opposing counsel,
and the decision is made to go forward despite the inability to respond
to the arguments raised.” 45 Evidence of this sort begins to shed more
42. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 358, 369 (Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 368.
44. See Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
794, 802 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Malice may be inferred from the lack of probable
cause.”). Courts have since clarified that subjective malice may not “be inferred
solely from an objective lack of probable cause.” Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 191 n.10 (Ct. App. 2010) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 747 (Cal.
2003) (“Merely because the prior action lacked legal tenability, as measured
objectively . . . without more, would not logically or reasonably permit the inference
that such lack of probable cause was accompanied by the actor’s subjective
malicious state of mind.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted). An absence of objective evidence, however, remains relevant.
See, e.g., Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 52 (Cal. 2006)
(explaining that although a “plaintiff must plead and prove actual ill will or some
improper ulterior motive . . . [m]alice may also be inferred from the facts
establishing lack of probable cause”) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and
citations omitted).
45. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 319 (“A trade secrets claim could be brought in good
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light on a party’s intent. In addition, more direct evidence of
subjective bad faith sometimes arises. In Gemini, for example, the
plaintiff’s principal “revealed his hostility toward [the defendant] and
its principal,” testifying in open court that the defendant was “snaky,”
that the defendant’s principal was a “snake,” and that he and the
principal of a third company were “two snakes in a paper sack.”46
Such personal animosity may, indeed, suggest an “improper motive,”
and thus subjective bad faith. 47
But what about the statements or conduct of a party that does not
occur in open court or otherwise—at least in the mind of the party—
“on the record”? Is there a risk that statements made or conduct
occurring in the context of settlement negotiations, or even mediation,
may constitute evidence of subjective bad faith, to be later used in
support of a request for attorneys’ fees under CUTSA? As discussed
below, the confidentiality of both settlement negotiations and
mediation, to differing degrees, may indeed yield to the important
public policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation.
II. THE ROBUST, BUT NARROW, CONFIDENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS MAY YIELD TO THE POLICY OF DETERRING BAD-FAITH
TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
As the cases above demonstrate, trade secret litigation—and
attorney-fee sanctions sought thereunder—can turn on the quantity
and quality of evidence presented.
The touchstone for the
admissibility of evidence, of course, is relevance. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” 48 And, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all
relevant evidence is admissible.” 49 But some considerations are so
faith but warrant attorney fees were the claim pursued beyond a point where the
plaintiff no longer believes the case has merit.”).
46. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
315 (“Subjective bad faith may be inferred by evidence that appellants intended to
cause unnecessary delay, filed the action to harass respondents, or harbored an
improper motive.”).
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 351.
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important that even relevant, material evidence is deemed
inadmissible. For example, to encourage free and open discussions,
much of what is said between an attorney and client, or a physician
and patient, while perhaps highly relevant, is nevertheless
inadmissible. 50
Similarly, although often clearly “of consequence to the
determination of the action,” 51 evidence of settlement offers or
demands, or communications relating to such offers or demands,
generally are confidential—and thus inadmissible. 52
Strictly
speaking, these communications are not “privileged” as that term is
defined in the Evidence Code. 53
They are thus potentially
discoverable. 54 They nevertheless are “confidential” insofar as—
within limits—they may not be admitted into evidence at trial.
A. Settlement Negotiations Enjoy Robust, but Narrow, Confidentiality
The confidentiality, and thus inadmissibility, of settlement
communications is “based on the public policy in favor of the
settlement of disputes without litigation and [is] intended to promote
candor.” 55 In other words, the hope is that people will be encouraged
to freely discuss the possibility of settlement without the fear of their
words being used against them should such settlement not materialize.
Indeed, the policy concerns at play are important enough that
protection is afforded not only to settlement offers and demands, but
50. See id. §§ 954, 994 (regarding attorney-client and physician-patient
privilege).
51. Id. § 210.
52. Id. §§ 1152, 1154.
53. See Covell v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1984)
(“Communications made in the course of settlement discussions are not ‘privileged.’
Privileged matters are defined in Division 8 of the Evidence Code, comprising
sections 900 to 1070. Section 1152 of the Evidence Code is contained in Division 9.
The statutory protection afforded to offers of settlement does not elevate them to the
status of privileged material. Our inquiry therefore must focus on whether discovery
of settlement negotiations is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action,’ or ‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence.’”).
54. Id.
55. Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 276 (Ct. App.
2007).
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also, more generally, to “statements made in the context of settlement
negotiations.” 56
Nevertheless, the confidentiality of settlement communications is
limited in scope. It is narrowly tailored to preclude the admission of
such communications as proof either of liability or of the
meritlessness of a claim. Specifically, evidence that someone has
made an offer to settle a claim, “as well as any conduct or statements
made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her
liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.” 57 Similarly,
“[e]vidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to
accept” a settlement offer “as well as any conduct or statements made
in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the
claim or any part of it.” 58
This is not an unusual limitation on the admissibility of evidence.
In general, the law attempts to avoid having socially desirable
behavior affect the risk of legal liability. One well-known example is
the law of “subsequent remedial conduct.” After harm has occurred,
taking socially beneficial steps toward reducing the risk of future harm
should be encouraged—and thus evidence of such steps should not
place a party at increased risk of liability for the past harm. Indeed,
this is the law in California. 59
The policy of decoupling socially desirable conduct from
increased risk of liability, however, does not preclude evidence of
such conduct for purposes other than proving the merits of a claim.
Thus, for example, although subsequent remedial conduct is not
admissible to prove negligence, 60 nothing in the Evidence Code
precludes its admission to show that a party “exercised control” over
56. Id. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 2009) (emphasis added); see also CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE CODE, 7
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N REP. 217 (1965) (explaining that this section “declares
that compromise offers are inadmissible to prove liability”) (emphasis added).
58. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1154 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
59. See id. § 1151 (“When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or
precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to
make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event.”).
60. Id.
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property on which harm occurred. 61 Similarly, “Evidence Code
sections 1152 and 1154 are not absolute bars to admissibility, since a
settlement document may be admissible for a purpose other than
proving liability.” 62 Thus, for example, evidence of settlement
negotiations is admissible “to show bias or prejudice of an adverse
party.” 63 As discussed further below, evidence of the bad faith of a
trade secret litigant may similarly fall outside the confidentiality
protections of the Evidence Code. 64
B. Settlement Negotiations Can Constitute Evidence of Bad Faith
In FLIR, the Court of Appeal addressed the impact of what one
might otherwise consider confidential communications—those made
in the context of settlement negotiations—on a finding of bad faith.
There, during settlement discussions with its former employees, FLIR
demanded “$75,000, a non-competition agreement, an agreement that
respondents would not hire [FLIR’s] employees,” and an assurance
that the former employees would not challenge certain patent
applications. 65 The Court of Appeal explained that, in awarding
sanctions, a trial court “may consider . . . bad faith settlement
demands”—and found that FLIR’s “settlement terms were
inflammatory, violated public policy, and were made in bad faith.” 66
But on what basis did the Court of Appeal in FLIR conclude that
settlement communications—which parties generally consider
confidential—are admissible evidence of subjective bad faith? In
other contexts, it seems clear that certain kinds of settlement
communications cross ethical boundaries—and may be used to
support an award of sanctions. In the recently decided Mendoza v.
Hamzeh, for example, Hamzeh, an attorney, sent a letter to Mendoza,
an adverse party, demanding at least $75,000 in settlement of an
61. Alcaraz v. Vece, 929 P.2d 1239, 1252 (Cal. 1997).
62. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 728 (Ct.
App. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff asserting an asbestos-based personal-injury
claim could not withhold from discovery—or perhaps even preclude from admission
into evidence—similar claims made against other entities).
63. Moreno v. Sayre, 208 Cal. Rptr. 444, 450 (Ct. App. 1984).
64. See infra Parts II.B, III.
65. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).
66. Id.
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underlying claim. 67 Hamzeh also threatened to report Mendoza “to
the California Attorney General, the Los Angeles District Attorney,
the Internal Revenue Service . . . the Better Business Bureau, as well
as to [Mendoza’s] customers and vendors” for various purported
“transgressions.” 68 Mendoza sued for, among other things, civil
extortion.69 Hamzeh brought an “anti-SLAPP” motion, seeking to
strike Mendoza’s complaint and requesting an award of attorneys’
fees. 70 The trial court denied the motion—and granted an award of
attorneys’ fees to Mendoza instead. 71
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It first noted that under
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, “a party may move to dismiss certain
unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally
protected speech or petitioning activity.” 72 The court then explained,
however, that “Hamzeh’s threat to report criminal conduct to
enforcement agencies and to Mendoza’s customers and vendors,
coupled with a demand for money, constitute[d] ‘criminal extortion as
a matter of law,’” and thus was not the sort of speech protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute. 73 The trial court had properly denied Hamzeh’s
anti-SLAPP motion and awarded attorneys’ fees to Mendoza in
connection with opposing that motion. 74 Although the Court of
Appeal did not publish its analysis of the award of attorneys’ fees, the
anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[i]f the court finds that a special
motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a

67. Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 833 (Ct. App. 2013).
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 834.
72. Mendoza, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2007) (“A cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”).
73. Mendoza, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 836 (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2,
22 (Cal. 2006)).
74. Id. at 837.
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plaintiff prevailing on the motion.” 75 Perhaps unsurprisingly, making
extortionate threats in the context of settlement “negotiations”—and
then defending those threats as “protected speech”—can subject a
party to an attorney-fee sanction.
Still, it is not clear to what extent settlement communications
falling short of extortionate demands may be admitted as evidence in
support of such a sanction. The FLIR court purported to rely on three
bases in permitting the use of settlement communications for this
purpose: 76 CUTSA; Gemini; and In re Marriage of Norton.77 None of
these authorities, however, states that settlement demands may form
the basis of a finding of subjective bad faith. CUTSA does not
mention it. Although Gemini notes in passing that the parties briefly
discussed settlement, 78 the court in no way relied on those settlement
discussions—or even suggested that they were relevant—in
concluding that Gemini acted in bad faith. And while Norton—a case
involving a contentious custody proceeding—suggests that conduct
frustrating the important policy of encouraging settlement may weigh
in favor of imposing an attorney-fee sanction, 79 the court nowhere
discusses whether the parties had attempted to settle their dispute—
much less whether a trial court may consider the content of settlement
communications in imposing such a sanction. Moreover, the FLIR
court nowhere addressed the question whether the confidentiality of
settlement negotiations impacted their admissibility.
Nevertheless, that FLIR failed to provide authority for its
consideration of settlement discussions does not mean that the court
got it wrong. Indeed, to see that the court got it right requires little
more than a literal reading of the Evidence Code. As discussed above,
statements made in furtherance of a settlement are inadmissible only
to the extent that they are offered to prove that the party offering to
settle was liable for an underlying wrong, 80 or that the claim of a party
agreeing to accept a settlement had no merit. 81 Nothing in the
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2007).
76. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).
77. 253 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1988).
78. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 358, 366 (Ct. App. 2002).
79. Norton, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
80. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 2009).
81. Id. § 1154.
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Evidence Code precludes the admission of settlement negotiations for
other purposes.
For example, in the context of insurance claims, the law “does not
preclude the introduction of settlement negotiations if offered not to
prove liability for the original loss but to prove failure to process the
claim fairly and in good faith.” 82 And in malicious prosecution cases,
such communications are admissible “to show that a case was litigated
for an improper purpose.” 83 It is no stretch of logic or language to
conclude, then, that settlement negotiations also are likely admissible
to prove that a trade secret litigant acted with subjective bad faith.
III. THE BROAD CONFIDENTIALITY AFFORDED TO MEDIATION LIKELY
PRECLUDES COMMUNICATIONS—BUT MAY PERMIT CONDUCT—AS
EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH
Unlike the somewhat limited scope of confidentiality afforded to
settlement communications, the confidentiality of mediation
communications is quite broad. In Cassel v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court recently explained that “to encourage the
candor necessary to a successful mediation, the Legislature has
broadly provided for the confidentiality of things spoken or written in
connection with a mediation proceeding.” 84 Specifically, under the
Evidence Code, “[n]o evidence” of statements made or writings
prepared “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a
mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to
discovery.” 85
Thus, mediation communications enjoy broad confidentiality.
Indeed, the Evidence Code explicitly states that “[a]ll
communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and
between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation
consultation shall remain confidential.” 86 This language strongly
suggests that the confidentiality of mediation may not yield to the
82. Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr.
2d 364, 411 (Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786, 797 (Ct.
App. 2004) (emphasis added).
84. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Cal. 2011).
85. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119(a)-(b) (West 2009).
86. Id. § 1119(c).
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policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation. As discussed
below, this appears to be true with regard to communications. But
with regard to conduct, the strength of mediation confidentiality is not
entirely clear.
A. Mediation Communications Are Given “Maximum Protection,”
and Thus Are Likely Inadmissible as Evidence of Bad Faith
In Cassel, the Court explained that although the provisions
described above “govern only the narrow category of mediationrelated communications . . . they apply broadly within that category,
and are designed to provide maximum protection for the privacy of
The Court has
communications in the mediation context.”87
“repeatedly said that these confidentiality provisions are clear and
absolute,” and that “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, they must be
strictly applied.” 88 Indeed, even in the face of important conflicting
policy considerations—and even in the face of sanctionable conduct—
mediation communications remain confidential.
1. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even in the Face of
Important Countervailing Public Policy
The California Supreme Court has been explicit that the
“maximum protection” afforded to mediation communications holds
true “even where competing public policies may be affected.” 89 In
general, “[t]he Legislature decided that the encouragement of
mediation to resolve disputes requires broad protection for the
confidentiality of communications exchanged in relation to that
process, even where this protection may sometimes result in the
unavailability of valuable civil evidence.” 90 Thus, the confidentiality
of mediation communications trumps even the laudable public policy
of deterring bad behavior among litigants. As the Court has
explained: “The Legislature chose to promote mediation by ensuring
confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in

87.
88.
89.
90.

Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1094 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id. at 1096.
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the mediation and litigation process. The mediation statutes provide
clear and comprehensive rules reflecting that policy choice.” 91
In Cassel, the Court held that the mediation privilege shielded
from disclosure communications between an attorney and his own
client, where the client intended to introduce those communications in
support of a claim of legal malpractice. 92 The holding in Cassel is
worth pausing over. Deterring legal malpractice is an obviously
important goal. Moreover, outside the context of mediation, the client
in Cassel surely could have waived the attorney-client privilege to
reveal the offending communications. 93 The attorney-client privilege,
after all, belongs to the client. 94
Nevertheless, Cassel instructs that inside the context of mediation,
the client has no such power. He or she may not unilaterally “waive”
confidentiality—even to prove legal malpractice. This is perhaps
explained, at least in part, by the fact that mediation confidentiality, as
with settlement confidentiality, is not a “privilege” belonging to any
one party. 95 Rather, it is a broad institutional policy meant to give
“maximum protection” to information, not particular individuals. 96
And this maximum protection generally will not yield, even to the
policy goal of safeguarding clients from legal malpractice.
The Court has not directly addressed the question of whether the
same is true with regard to the strong public policy meant to deter
bad-faith trade secret litigation. The logic of Cassel, however,
strongly implies that as in the context of legal-malpractice claims,
mediation communications are likely inadmissible to prove the
improper motives of trade secret litigants.

91. Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 946 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added).
92. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1087.
93. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 958 (West 2009) (“There is no privilege . . . as to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a
duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.”).
94. See id. § 953(a) (“‘[H]older of the privilege’ means . . . [t]he client, if the
client has no guardian or conservator.”).
95. See Wimsatt v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 208 n.4 (Ct. App.
2007) (“[B]ecause the mediation confidentiality rules are not ‘privileges’ in the
traditional sense, and because the Evidence Code does not use the phrase ‘privilege,’
we will use the term ‘mediation confidentiality.’”) (citations omitted).
96. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1094.
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2. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even When They
Otherwise Would Support Sanctions
Indeed, although California courts have not directly addressed
whether mediation-related communications may be disclosed in
support of a claim that a party brought or maintained a trade secret
case in bad faith, the California Supreme Court, ten years prior to
deciding Cassel, addressed an arguably more general—and thus
inclusive—issue. In Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea
California, Inc., the Court faced the “intersection” between the
confidentiality of mediation-related communications and the question
of whether a court may exercise its “power . . . to control proceedings
before it . . . by imposing sanctions on a party or the party’s attorney
for statements or conduct during mediation.” 97 In that case and those
that followed, it appears that the confidentiality of mediation
communications is not likely to yield to the policy of deterring badfaith litigation.
In Foxgate, a homeowners’ association brought a constructiondefect case against certain developers and subcontractors. 98 The trial
court ordered mediation, to which the parties were required to bring
their experts. 99 The defendants, however, not only were late to the
first day of mediation, but also failed to bring any of their experts. 100
The mediator thus cancelled the mediation. 101 The homeowners’
association moved for sanctions, ultimately seeking over $30,000 in
attorneys’ fees and costs, relying on a declaration provided by the
mediator in support of an argument that the defendants’ failure to
properly participate in mediation was in bad faith. 102 Over the
objection of the defendants, who claimed that the mediator’s
declaration was inadmissible under statutes governing the
confidentiality of mediation, the trial court granted the motion. 103 The

97. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117,
1119 (Cal. 2001).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1120.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1120-22.
103. Id. at 1122.
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Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to
provide a more detailed explanation of the basis for sanctions. 104 In
doing so, however, it rejected the defendants’ “confidentiality”
argument, reasoning that the statutes governing the confidentiality of
mediation were “not intended to shield sanctionable conduct.” 105
The Supreme Court disagreed. It acknowledged the concern, in
the face of California’s strong public policy favoring alternative
dispute resolution, that the defendants may not have “participate[d] in
good faith in the mediation process.” 106 But the Court also recognized
that “the Legislature has weighed and balanced the policy that
promotes effective mediation by requiring confidentiality against a
policy that might better encourage good faith participation in the
process.” 107 It thus held that “none of the confidentiality statutes
currently makes an exception for reporting bad faith conduct or for
imposition of sanctions . . . when doing so would require disclosure of
communications.” 108
As the Cassel court explained, the “frank exchange” meant to be
encouraged by confidentiality “is achieved only if the participants
know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their
detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory
processes.” 109 And according to the Foxgate court, this protected
“frank exchange” reaches even to communications that might
otherwise be sanctionable.
The protection of mediation
communications could scarcely be broader.
B. Mediation Conduct, However, May in Principle Provide a Basis
for a Finding of Bad Faith
Nevertheless, despite the broad nature of the statutes establishing
the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, and the Supreme Court’s
consistent interpretations of those statutes as “unambiguous” in doing

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1123.
106. Id. at 1127-28.
107. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1128.
108. Id.
109. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1087 (Cal. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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so, 110 mediation confidentiality may not entirely shield a party from
sanctions. In analyzing the confidentiality of mediation, the Foxgate
court noted: “The statutes are clear. [They] prohibit[] any person,
mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral
communication made during mediation . . . [and] prohibit[] the
mediator, but not a party, from advising the court about conduct
during mediation that might warrant sanctions.” 111 Thus, while the
Foxgate court meant to stress that the mediation-confidentiality
statutes unequivocally prohibit any participant from revealing
communications made during mediation, and also prohibit a mediator
from revealing conduct during a mediation, it also noted that the
language of the statutes does not prohibit a “party” from advising the
court about conduct occurring during mediation. Could this provide a
narrow basis for supporting an award of sanctions based on a party’s
bad faith?
At least one court has answered that question in the affirmative.
In Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Service & Repairs, Inc.,
the plaintiffs brought claims of negligence and products liability
against the manufacturer, seller, and installer of a swimming pool
filter that exploded, causing severe injuries. 112 The plaintiffs
prevailed at trial, and the defendants appealed. 113 The Court of
Appeal ordered mediation, under what the court described as the
“relatively recent advent of court-ordered mediation of certain cases
on appeal,” which, according to the court, “has been a resounding
success.” 114 After the defendants’ excess insurer, however, failed to
appear at mediation—thus defeating the requirement that all parties
have full settlement authority—the plaintiffs sought sanctions in the
form of attorneys’ fees and costs, in excess of $19,000. 115
The Court of Appeal denied the request—but only because the
excess insurer had not been notified of the mediation, and there had
not yet been a published appellate decision holding that parties have
110. Id. at 1094.
111. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1125.
112. Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2008).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 553.
115. Id. at 555-56.
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an obligation to provide such notice. 116 The court made it clear,
however, that “[h]enceforth,” sanctions would follow a failure to
notify insurance carriers of court-ordered mediation. 117 Moreover, the
“unauthorized failure of a party, the party’s attorney, or a
representative of a party’s insurance carrier, to attend a court-ordered
appellate mediation” would “warrant[] imposition of sanctions” in
future cases. 118
In reaching this result, the Campagnone court found a basis for
distinguishing Foxgate and the broad confidentiality afforded
mediation proceedings. The court first noted its authority to “impose
sanctions” for violations of the rules of court, and that “monetary
sanctions . . . may include payment of the aggrieved party’s attorney
fees and costs.” 119 But the court also recognized that, because the
plaintiffs sought sanctions based on mediation-related conduct, the
“issue is complicated . . . by the confidentiality that is afforded to the
mediation process.” 120 Indeed, the court noted the broad language of
the statutes providing for such confidentiality and, quoting Foxgate,
recognized that “communications made during mediation or for the
purpose of a mediation consultation” are unquestionably
confidential. 121
Seizing on the Foxgate court’s further proposition, however, the
Campagnone court explained: “On the other hand, the confidentiality
rules do not prohibit ‘a party’ from ‘advising the court about conduct
during mediation that might warrant sanctions.’” 122 Thus, the court
reasoned, the “failure to have all persons or representatives attend
court-ordered appellate mediation . . . is conduct that a party . . . may
report to the court as a basis for monetary sanctions.” 123
Accordingly, not all matters related to mediation are
confidential—and some matters related to mediation may be used to
support an award of attorneys’ fees as a monetary sanction. Under
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 556.
Campagnone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 556.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 554.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Campagnone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 554.
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
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Campagnone, and under a straightforward reading of the statutes
providing for mediation confidentiality, there is no obligation to keep
certain forms of conduct confidential. Thus, by extension, one might
plausibly argue that the conduct of a party asserting trade secret
claims under CUTSA, even where that conduct occurs in the context
of mediation, might constitute admissible evidence of that party’s bad
faith in connection with a request for attorneys’ fees. Even the
mediation privilege, it seems, might bend in the face of bad-faith trade
secret litigation.
But how far does this exception reach? The Campagnone court
indicated that “reporting anything more” than the sort of conduct at
issue there—a failure to appear at mediation—“may violate the
confidentiality rules.” 124 In other words, if a party asserting a trade
secret claim unreasonably fails to appear at mediation, perhaps that
fact—and only that fact—is admissible to show bad faith. This seems
a slim reed on which to support a case for bad-faith litigation. Could
other forms of mediation-related “conduct” be admissible to show bad
faith? Plausible examples are difficult to conceive of. Suppose a
party makes disparaging comments, or even threats amounting to
coercive conduct, at mediation. Despite the important goal of
preventing such coercion, it is not difficult to imagine a court
considering those to be protected “communications.” 125
Suppose, however, that a party’s actions at mediation—perhaps
via body language, tone of voice, or gesture—amount to non-verbal
strong-arm tactics, or, alternatively, imply the absence of a good-faith
belief in the claims asserted. Would such conduct be admissible to
show bad faith? The answer might turn on the extent to which such
non-verbal conduct is more or less plausibly described as
“communication.” Certainly some gestures meet that plausibility test.
But perhaps other conduct does not. In the right circumstances, it
seems at least possible that litigation might be needed to decide
whether conduct falls under what one might call the “Campagnone
Rule”—and thus is available for use in a CUTSA fee request.

124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Provost v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 60405 (Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument, in support of an attempt to
invalidate a settlement agreement, that he should be permitted to introduce evidence
that he was “coerced” into signing it).
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CONCLUSION
Arguably, both CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule and the confidentiality
of settlement negotiations and mediation serve the same goal: efficient
dispute resolution. The former policy—the “stick”—serves as a
reminder that unjustifiably bringing or prolonging meritless litigation
will be punished; the latter policy—the “carrot”—permits frank, open
evaluation and discussion of settlement and mediation opportunities.
These consistent legal rules nevertheless can come into conflict.
When they do, there is a significant risk that the confidentiality of
settlement communications may yield to the policy of deterring badfaith trade secret litigation; and that although mediation
communications are likely to remain confidential in the face of this
important public policy, mediation conduct, at least in principle, may
be vulnerable to being used as evidence of bad faith.
Parties to trade secret litigation should therefore be wary of what
they say, and how they act, while attempting to negotiate a settlement
or mediate a dispute. While it should perhaps be unnecessary to say,
being frank and forthright is not a license to act in bad faith. In
settlement negotiations, trade secret plaintiffs should thus avoid
proposing settlement terms that are “inflammatory,” illegal, or that
otherwise “violate[] public policy.” 126 Avoiding extortionate threats
needs little explanation. 127 But even somewhat more reasonable
parties may overreach. In California, agreements under which a party
is “restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business”
generally are “void.” 128 Thus, even if the results of doing so might at
first blush seem desirable from a business perspective, a plaintiff
should not demand non-competition agreements; 129 concessions that a
defendant will not hire the plaintiff’s employees; 130 financial terms
disconnected from the evidence; 131 or agreements that a defendant
will “assign” to the plaintiff intellectual property subsequently

126.
127.
2013).
128.
129.
130.
131.

FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 835-36 (Ct. App.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).
See, e.g., FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318.
See id.
See id.
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conceived. 132 Furthermore, plaintiffs should not demand “market
allocation” schemes, under which competitors carve up a market,
effectively restraining one another from competing. 133 And of course,
personal attacks on an adversary, its employees, or its principal,
should be avoided—even if you are convinced that you are dealing
with “two snakes in a paper sack.” 134
Given the extraordinary strength of confidentiality attached to
mediation, many of these concerns might be less pressing. The
“maximum protection” afforded to communications in the context of
mediation likely shields even the sort of demands—and insults—
described above. 135 Indeed, California’s Legislature did not “adopt a
scheme to ensure good behavior in the mediation . . . process.”136
Nevertheless, some conduct may cross the line.
Under the
Campagnone Rule, a party may disclose an outright failure to appear
at mediation as evidence of bad faith. 137 It seems plausible to wonder
whether functionally similar conduct—say, appearing at mediation but
refusing to participate—might also constitute admissible evidence of
bad faith. Whether other forms of non-communicative conduct at
mediation may support a request for sanctions is unknown, but it
would be logically consistent with Campanogne for such conduct to

132. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip.
(Shanghai) Co., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Assignment clauses
function as unlawful non-compete provisions where they require an employee to
assign an invention conceived after departing from an employer’s service.”).
133. Compare Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 87, 91 (Ct. App. 1980) (“It is settled that distributors cannot lawfully agree to
divide territories or customers. Such conduct is sometimes called a ‘horizontal
restraint,’ and is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”), with Dimidowich v. Bell
& Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Guild Wineries . . . ignores the
possible benefits to interbrand competition that can result from allowing restrictions
in the intrabrand market.”).
134. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 358, 369 (Ct. App. 2002).
135. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1094 (Cal. 2011).
136. Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 946 (Cal. 2008).
137. See Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77
Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); cf. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1125 (Cal. 2001) (holding that mediation
confidentiality precludes “the mediator, but not a party, from advising the court
about conduct during mediation that might warrant sanctions”).
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be admissible. Thus, as in settlement negotiations, good behavior is
good advice.
Nevertheless, as is often the case in litigation and elsewhere,
although behaving well may be necessary to avoid trouble, it may not
be sufficient. Even if a party brings and maintains an objectively
meritorious trade secret claim in good faith, and is on its best behavior
during settlement negotiations or mediation, a risk remains. If the
target of the claim prevails on the merits, there is little to prevent it
from then alleging bad faith—thus opening the possibility that
otherwise confidential communications might be revealed. In other
words, a successful defendant could seek to capitalize on its success,
and, perhaps in a bad faith attempt to punish an unsuccessful-butsincere plaintiff, introduce evidence of settlement negotiations or
mediation conduct in support of a sanctions motion. 138 To prevent
this, parties should always consider entering into express, written
agreements that anything said—or done—during settlement
negotiations and mediation will remain strictly confidential. “Behave
yourself” may be good advice, but “get it in writing” is even better.

138. Of course, doing so could backfire if the court is convinced that the
defendant did so in bad faith. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West 1997)
(“Every trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both to pay any
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result
of bad-faith actions or tactics[.]”).
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